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A NEW ROLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE: A MODEL TO ENFORCE END 
USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS 
JESSICA GALLEGOS*
ABSTRACT
 This Note examines tortious interference, provides an overview of its controversial histo-
ry and scholarly critiques, and evaluates new uses for tortious interference in the digital 
age. Through an overview of recent case law from the unlikely field of copyright law, this 
Note uncovers a new phenomenon in the law: parties to copyright litigation are using tor-
tious interference as a model to enforce end user license agreements. This is both genius and 
problematic. It is genius on the part of those bringing breach of end user license agreement 
claims because tortious interference grants companies a remedy at law when third parties 
induce end users to breach their end user agreement. In the digital age, it provides a solu-
tion to companies faced with a reluctance to endure enormous litigation costs and public 
relations nightmares that accompany direct suits against potentially thousands of end user 
consumers of their products.1 However, the solution of tortious interference is also problem-
atic in the digital age: it creates an incentive for companies to write end user agreements 
without ever intending to enforce the terms against the end users themselves. Instead, these 
companies intend to enforce the terms against their competition. This is extremely question-
able because it usurps the underlying philosophies of both tortious interference and contract 
law. Ultimately, this Note suggests that tortious interference should be affirmed as a new 
model to enforce end user license agreements. However, this Note also suggests limiting this 
new model’s negative implications with a burden-shifting misuse doctrine, which preserves 
the heroic attributes of tortious interference and limits it to protect the integrity of contract 
law.  
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 1.  “In the mass market, licenses are usually ‘enforced’ by the good will of the end 
user, not by litigation. The cost of enforcing contracts in a court of law with multiple indi-
viduals would be prohibitive in most cases.”  Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious 
About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing For Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 696 
n.50 (2004). The Napster and YouTube phenomena exemplify copyright owners’ reluctance 
to sue end users. See Nate Anderson, Viacom’s Top Lawyer: Suing P2P Users “Felt Like 
Terrorism,” ARS TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/11/viacoms-top-
lawyer-suing-p2p-users-felt-like-terrorism.ars (Viacom general counsel explains that suing 
end users is “expensive, and it’s painful, and it feels like bullying.”).  
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Copyright owners attempt to control end users2 through copyright 
and contract law. This is nothing new. Traditional copyright law 
seeks to limit copyright owners’ control of and allow public access to 
copyrighted works. One such limit allows public access to copyrighted 
works when copyright terms expire. The recent enactment of the Dig-
ital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)’s Anticircumvention Rule3
expanded copyright owners’ power to protect their digital property in 
the internet age by permitting them to rewrite and expand tradition-
al copyright limits. Copyright owners subsequently used their newly 
acquired DMCA power to limit end users’ use of copyrighted products 
through end user agreements and DMCA preventative mechanisms. 
Because of the immense amount of power that it afforded copyright 
owners, many scholars advocate rewriting the DMCA text to limit 
that power.4 Contract law provides another avenue for copyright 
owners to expand public use of copyrighted works through end user 
license agreements (EULAs). To address this alternate avenue, some 
advocate a DMCA misuse doctrine that bars copyright infringement 
claims when copyright owners expand their power beyond traditional 
copyright limits through EULAs.5
 This Note demonstrates that such solutions address only half of 
the problem: they leave tortious interference with a contract as an-
other tool with which companies can control end users and their 
                                                                                                                  
 2. For the purposes of this Note, “end user” refers to consumers who ultimately buy 
and use a copyrighted product.  
 3. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 4. See generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the 
Night: Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 495, 499-500 (2004) (arguing that click-wrap and shrink-wrap licenses chill speech 
about products, suppress competition, and allow copyright owners to contract around  
copyright law). 
 5. Id. at 501. 
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competition. The recent cases of MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc.6 and Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark 
International, Inc.7 illustrate a pattern of companies’ attempts to con-
trol end users through both the DMCA and tortious interference. 
Thus, even if critics convince Congress to limit the DMCA’s Anticir-
cumvention Rule or to create a DMCA misuse doctrine, tortious inter-
ference provides yet another model for companies to control end users 
by suing third-party competitors when end users breach end  
user agreements. 
 This is a new use for tortious interference. An examination of tor-
tious interference’s history and an analysis of relevant cases reveal 
that using tortious interference as a model to enforce EULAs is neces-
sary in some cases and problematic in others. Tortious interference 
serves a new, legitimate role because of the litigation costs involved in 
suing potentially thousands of end users and the public relations con-
cerns in the digital age.8 It grants companies a remedy at law when 
third parties induce end users to breach their end user agreements. 
However, companies can also misuse tortious interference when writ-
ing their end user agreements when they do so without the intention of 
enforcing them except against their competitors. Ultimately, this Note 
suggests that tortious interference should be affirmed as a new model 
to enforce EULAs. However, this Note also advocates a misuse doc-
trine to limit this new model’s negative implications.  
 In Section II, this Note generally discusses the historical back-
ground and critiques of tortious interference. In Section III, this Note 
presents the cases of MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertain-
ment, Inc. and Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Interna-
tional, Inc., where companies used DMCA claims and tortious inter-
ference with end user agreement claims against competitors to con-
trol the use of their copyrighted products. Section IV discusses the 
positive and negative implications of this new use of tortious inter-
ference to enforce end user agreements. This Note responds by pro-
posing a misuse doctrine that attempts to preserve the positive im-
plications and limit the negative implications of this new use. Final-
ly, Section V invites others to test this misuse theory on the broader 
scale of tortious interference, generally. 
                                                                                                                  
 6. 616 F. Supp. 2d 958 (D. Ariz. 2009); MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. 
CV-06-2555-PHX-DCG, 2008 WL 2757357 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008).  
 7.  615 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
 8. “In the mass market, licenses are usually ‘enforced’ by the good will of the end 
user, not by litigation. The cost of enforcing contracts in a court of law with multiple indi-
viduals would be prohibitive in most cases.”  Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious 
About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing For Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 696 
n.50 (2004).  The Napster and YouTube phenomena exemplify copyright owners’ reluctance 
to sue end users. See supra note 1. 
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II.   BACKGROUND OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
 This Note argues that the digital age provided another opportuni-
ty to expand the application of tortious interference to enforce end 
user agreements. The history and expansion of tortious interference 
provides a backdrop necessary to truly appreciate the benefits of and 
problems associated with the new model. The claim’s property and 
anticompetition policy roots confirm that using tortious interference 
as a means to protect intellectual property interests through EULAs 
is extremely faithful to the history of tortious interference. The great 
expansion of tortious interference from those humble beginnings also 
foreshadows the potential for misuse by copyright owners as dis-
cussed later in the Note. 
A.   The History of Tortious Interference 
 Tortious interference began as tool to protect Roman and English 
property interests in their servants before it morphed into a full-
blown cause of action.9 Before its official recognition, courts began 
applying the emerging cause of action to further anticompetition pol-
icies during labor shortages.10 The Queen’s Bench officially recog-
nized the first tortious interference cause of action when it held thea-
ter owner Gye liable for inducing opera singer Johanna Wagner to 
breach her contract with another theater owner named Lumley.11
Apparently the court reasoned that the historical property interest 
created between a master and servant was sufficiently similar to the 
property interest created between freely contracting parties who en-
ter a contract for personal services. Inducing Wagner to breach her 
contract constituted malicious interference with Lumley’s property 
                                                                                                                  
 9. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 979-
80 (5th ed. 1984); Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 
664-65 (1923) (citing the Ordinance of Labourers, 23 EDW. III (1349)); Note, Tortious Inter-
ference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Prop-
erty, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1513-15 (1980) (discussing that business 
tort was not recognized until the nineteenth century). 
 10. Sayre, supra note 9, at 665-66; see also Gary D. Wexler, Intentional Interference 
with Contract: Market Efficiency and Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CONN. L. REV.
279, 285 (1994). 
 11. As early as the fourteenth century, the application of tortious interference where 
competition interfered with one’s potential or current customers was recognized; however, 
tortious interference was not actionable until the nineteenth century. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 716 (Tex. 2001); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, BUSI-
NESS TORTS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION HANDBOOK 106 n.11 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter ABA
HANDBOOK]; Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship in the Nineteenth Centu-
ry: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, supra note 9, at 1522; cf. Frederick 
H. Cooke, A Proposed New Definition of a Tort, 12 HARV. L. REV. 335, 339 (1898) (address-
ing whether the liability for inducing breach should arise when it is a natural outgrowth of 
competition).  
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interest in that contract and triggered tort liability.12 The Lumley
court established liability in “all cases where there is an unlawful 
and malicious enticing away of any person employed to give his per-
sonal labour or service for a given time under the direction of a mas-
ter or employer who is injured by the wrongful act.”13 This holding 
left open the door for expansion of the rule in contexts beyond the 
master/servant relationship; in fact, the holding explicitly defined 
master/servant relationships as including contractual relationships.14
B.   The Great Expansion of Tortious Interference 
 Since the court first applied tortious interference in Lumley v. 
Gye, the cause of action has expanded rapidly and in many direc-
tions. Courts have applied tortious interference to many contexts: 
interference with prospective business relationships,15 merely advis-
ing a party to breach,16 franchise contexts, labor-law disputes (in-
deed, it is the foundation for strike law),17 antitrust disputes,18 inter-
ference with advertising,19 and interference with the expectation of 
inheritance.20 Juries have also awarded plaintiffs massive punitive 
damages for tortious interference claims.21 One commentator has 
even suggested that it should be applied to interference with the ex-
pectation of a gift.22
 The tort’s standard of liability and elements varies greatly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.23 Most courts attempt to use the Restate-
                                                                                                                  
 12. Lumley v. Gye, [1853] 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.) 754; see also Sayre, supra note 9, 
at 667-68. 
 13.  Lumley, [1853] 118 Eng. Rep. at 754. 
 14. The Lumley court held that liability extends to the master/servant relationship, 
which includes situations “where a party has contracted to give his personal services for a 
certain time to another.” Id. at 755. 
 15. Temperton v. Russel, [1893] 1 Eng. Rep.(Q.B). 715, 715.  
 16. J.D. Edwards & Co. v. Podany, 168 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 17. David Howarth, Against Lumley v. Gye, 68 MOD. L. REV. 195, 209 (2005). Tortious 
interference claims relating to both labor-law and antitrust disputes are now largely sub-
ject to preemption. Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic 
Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 62 n.4 (1980).
 18. Perlman, supra note 17, at 62 n.4. 
 19. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Daisy Out-
door Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 473 S.E.2d 47, 48-49 (S.C. 1996); see also Chhina Family P’ship, 
L.P. v. S-K Grp. of Motels, Inc., 622 S.E.2d 40, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).  
 20. Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 188 S.E. 390, 391 (N.C. 1936); Harmon 
v. Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020, 1021-22 (Me. 1979). 
 21. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 4 (1987) (awarding Pennzoil $3 billion in 
punitive damages). 
 22. Note, Intentional Interference with the Expectation of a Gift, 48 HARV. L. REV. 984, 
984 (1935). 
 23. Derek G. Howard & Mary B. Cranston, The Interference Torts, in BUSINESS TORTS 
& UNFAIR COMPETITION: A PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK 95, 99 (A. Michael Ferrill ed., 1996);
see Wexler, supra note 10, at 291-92. This can also be deduced from a mere scanning of 
cases, law review articles, handbooks, and jury instructions which cite to the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979). 
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ment’s standard of liability because, despite the Restatement’s vague 
requirements, it remains one of the most straightforward articula-
tions of the doctrine.24 The Restatement requires five elements to 
prove tortious interference liability: (1) a valid contract (or prospec-
tive contractual relations),25 (2) knowledge of the contract by the in-
terfering party, (3) intentional and improper inducement to breach 
the contract,26 (4) actual breach, and (5) damages.27 In response to 
practice-oriented and academic confusion as to what “improper” 
means, the Restatement provides seven factors to determine if an im-
proper act exists: 
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, 
(b) the actor’s motive, 
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct inter-
feres, 
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, 
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the ac-
tor and the contractual interests of the other, 
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the inter-
ference and 
(g) the relations between the parties.28
Courts tend to apply these factors against the interests of the alleg-
edly interfering party because, when balancing the interests of socie-
ty (preserving their “security of transaction”), the contracting party 
(preserving her freedom to contract) and the interfering party (pre-
serving her freedom to act, compete, and create),29 the interfering 
party will almost always lose. When an interfering party is a compet-
itor, both the Restatement of Torts and the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition hold that a contracting party’s interest in a secure mar-
ketplace typically trumps the conflicting interests of the interfering 
                                                                                                                  
 24. Howard & Cranston, supra note 23, at 98-99. 
 25. So long as the contract is not otherwise void by public policy, tortious interference 
liability will be found. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 994. Voidable contracts may be 
the basis for a tortious interference claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §766 cmt. f 
(1979). Some courts do not find liability for tortious interference with an at-will contract, 
reasoning that at-will contracts do not guarantee performance. See Flash Elecs., Inc. v. 
Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 379, 404 (E.D.N.Y 2004); Guard-
Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 449 n.4 (N.Y. 1980); ABA
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 118. 
 26. Initially, courts required malice to attribute tortious interference liability to a 
defendant, but failed to adequately define malice. To clear up the confusion around the 
malice standard of liability, the Restatement changed the malice standard to “improper,” 
attributing liability to a third party “who intentionally and improperly interferes with the 
performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise 
causing the third person not to perform the contract.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
766 (1979).  
 27. Howard & Cranston, supra note 23, at 99. 
 28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).  
 29. Howard & Cranston, supra note 23, at 107; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 767 (1979). 
2011] A NEW ROLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 417
party’s right to compete—and thus reject competition as a defense in 
favor of a secure marketplace,30 balancing the interests heavily 
against the interfering party.31 Where a contract exists, the drafters 
of the Restatements prefer contractual stability, resulting in defer-
ence to the plaintiff as he asserts the elements of his tortious  
interference claim. 
 Where the plaintiff successfully asserts all elements of a tortious 
interference claim, the defendant may respond with a privilege to 
interfere. A privilege is essentially a party’s assertion that the con-
text or circumstances surrounding the alleged interference render 
the conduct appropriate.32 But even searching for a privilege will not 
save a competitor. Lawful competition is not a privilege for tortious 
interference where an actual contract exists.33
C.   Critiques of Tortious Interference 
 Advocates defend tortious interference as a safety valve of con-
tract law by providing a remedy where contract law should but fails. 
For instance, tortious interference serves to remedy the perceived 
inadequacy of contract law damages, which usually do not avail 
plaintiffs damages when the breaching party is insolvent,34 when the 
plaintiff cannot sue its many breaching end users due to the cost and 
bad taste of litigation, or in most cases where the plaintiff seeks liti-
gation expenses or emotional or punitive damages.35 It also protects 
the institution of contractual relationships by deterring behavior that 
leads to breach, thus preserving relational integrity between parties36
and the moral basis of contract law.37
                                                                                                                  
 30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995); see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979). 
 31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(d); see also Howard & Cranston, su-
pra note 23, at 112-13. 
 32. Howard & Cranston, supra note 23, at 107; Perlman, supra note 17, at 91-93; ABA
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 108.
 33. Where there are only prospective economic relations (no contract), tort law allows 
competition as a privilege against liability so long as the interfering party used lawful 
means to vie for potential customers and was not motivated by subjective desire to harm 
his or her competitor. Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition 
in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1993) (arguing 
that tortious interference liability may “chill legitimate business practices”).  
 34. Wexler, supra note 10, at 305.  
 35. Contract law rarely awards punitive damages. See generally William S. Dodge, 
The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629 (1999). 
 36. William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractarians, Community, and the Tort of Interfer-
ence with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1176 (1996).
 37. If a promise between two parties places a moral duty on a third party to refrain 
from interfering, and breaching a contract is also considered an immoral act, then the in-
terfering party and the breaching party have acted equally immorally: both breach moral 
duties to refrain from obstructing the performance of a promise.  
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 Further, tortious interference provides a method for allocating 
risk of breach to the least cost avoider.38 Traditional contract law al-
lows parties to allocate risk between each other. Interference by a 
noncontracting third party upsets the bargained-for equation, includ-
ing the allocation of risk. Where contracts are necessarily incomplete 
because they say nothing of liability to third parties, tortious inter-
ference steps in to complete the contract when third parties inter-
vene, acting as a default rule. It allocates the liability to the least 
cost avoider—the interfering party. It creates incentives for contract-
ing parties to sue the interfering party because a tortious interfer-
ence claim results in a punitive damages award (where a mere con-
tract claim does not). This restores the balance when third parties 
upset the normal flow of a contract by interfering and allocates harm 
to the least cost avoider: the tortious interferer.39
 Critics of tortious interference endorse the limitation or altogether 
elimination of tortious interference because of its perceived inconsist-
encies with contract law and its vague standard of liability.40 Tortious 
interference is inconsistent in many ways with contract law: it doles 
out punitive damages on a regular basis,41 imposes obligations on 
parties who lack privity to the contract,42 and is inconsistent with a 
Holmesian theory of contract.43 Granting punitive damages arguably 
gives parties more than the benefit of their bargain44 and throws off 
the cost-benefit analysis in which parties engage when they bargain 
for their exchange. Tort liability in contract is in and of itself prob-
lematic: breach of contract never constitutes a tort unless a “legal 
duty independent of the contract itself has been violated,”45 so it 
seems inconsistent to attribute tortious liability on a third party for a 
breach that would never impute tort liability to a contracting party. 
It also says nothing of efficiency created by tortious interference. To 
address this, efficient-breach theorists argue that tortiously interfer-
                                                                                                                  
 38. Wexler, supra note 10, at 316-17 (explaining the theories of Landes and Posner). 
 39. Id.
 40. See Woodward, supra note 36, at 1127.  
 41. Granting punitive damages arguably gives parties more than the benefit of their 
bargain. Wexler, supra note 10, at 294-95. 
 42. See Howarth, supra note 17, at 195 (arguing that “contract law is optional” and 
should not typically impose “obligations on unwilling parties”).  
 43. J. Oliver Wendell Holmes sees nothing moral about contract law—for to breach a 
contract is simply to invoke a right to breach; a contract is merely a legally enforceable 
promise that gives parties a choice between keeping the promise or paying a compensatory 
sum of damages. JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 1 (9th ed. 
2008). If Holmes is right, then there is no moral problem with inducing someone to breach 
a contract, for you are merely helping her exercise a right.  
 44. Wexler, supra note 10, at 293-95. 
 45. 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 1 (2010). 
2011] A NEW ROLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 419
ing parties should be rewarded, not punished, when their interfer-
ence fosters efficient breaches.46
 The largest area of critique characterizes tortious interference as a 
“broad and undefined tort in which no specific conduct is proscribed and 
in which liability turns on the purpose for which the defendant acts, 
with the indistinct notion that the purposes must be considered improp-
er in some undefined way.”47 Scholars critique the Restatement’s im-
proper standard as vague: “[t]he problem with the interference tort lies 
in the complete absence of any principle that will explain to us what 
judgments to make” and when to impose liability.48 Critics argue that 
courts apply the cause of action too broadly on an ad hoc basis, with no 
clear and consistent standard of liability across jurisdictions.49
III.   A NEW USE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE: A MODEL TO ENFORCE 
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS
A.   Background of Digital Millennium Copyright Act and End User 
License Agreements 
 In the digital age, the DMCA and contract law provide opportuni-
ties for copyright holders to avoid traditional copyright limitations 
and to control their end users and their competition. Copyright own-
ers exploit one such opportunity by using a preventative mechanism 
in the form of digital code to prevent access to their copyrighted digi-
tal work. When anyone circumvents that preventative mechanism, 
the DMCA creates a cause of action for the copyright owner against 
the circumventer. Copyright owners can potentially misuse this 
DMCA Anticircumvention Rule by placing preventative mechanisms 
on noncopyrighted works thus expanding his control over his work, 
                                                                                                                  
 46. The existence of tortious interference as an available cause of action may also 
deter efficient breach because it complicates the usual contract incentives for performance 
and breach. Many Efficient-Breach theorists posit that tortious interference necessarily 
conflicts with efficiency and therefore generates undesirable outcomes by (1) discouraging 
efficient breaches (because it imposes a tort incentive to refrain from intervening instead of 
a contract efficiency incentive that might require intervention when breach is more effi-
cient than performance); or (2) encouraging too many breaches, even when it may be ineffi-
cient to do so (because it adds a second potential defendant upon breach, the contracting 
party may be more apt to breach because the nonbreaching party may sue the tortious 
interfering party instead of her). Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L.
REV. 877, 930 (1990); see Woodward, supra note 36, at 1139. 
 47. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 129, at 979. 
 48.  Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. 
REV. 335, 346 (1981).  
 49. One attempt to redefine the standard of liability is Perlman’s Unlawful Means 
Test, which makes liability available only where the interfering party used unlawful 
means to interfere. Perlman, supra note 17, passim. Another attempt is Dowling’s Expan-
sion of Unlawful Means, which makes liability available only in cases of interference where 
the plaintiff has no other remedy and the interfering party used unlawful means to inter-
fere. Donald C. Dowling Jr., A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort: Limiting Interference 
with Contract Beyond the Unlawful Means Test, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487, 513-18 (1986).  
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services, and products. This, in turn, enlarges copyright owner con-
trol over consumers and end users beyond what the drafters of tradi-
tional copyright law intended. In response, critics in droves suggest 
that the legislature should revise areas of the DMCA to better match 
traditional copyright law.50
 Copyright owners also employ contract law to expand their rights 
to control copyrighted work beyond traditional boundaries. By writ-
ing limits of use in end user license agreements upon the sale of cop-
yrighted works to consumers, copyright owners expressly limit access 
to copyrighted material by both end users and competitors.51 These 
agreements often take the form of shrink-wrap and click-wrap 
agreements. Shrink-wrap agreements derive their name from the 
shrink-wrap packaging around software. Inside the package are li-
cense agreements, many times drafted by the copyright owners and 
enforceable at law as a contract. When the consumer opens the 
“shrink-wrapped” product, “the user assents to the software terms 
enclosed within.”52 Click-wrap agreements are the digital equivalent 
of shrink-wrap agreements, but the consumer “clicks” on the digital 
product to assent to software terms.53
 While most courts uphold shrink-wrap and click-wrap user 
agreements as enforceable contracts, many academics seek to limit 
their enforceability.54 Users rarely read or understand the terms of 
click-wrap and shrink-wrap agreements and they afford an enormous 
amount of power to copyright owners. Shrink-wrap and click-wrap 
agreements constitute offer and acceptance upon the unilateral offer 
and subsequent keeping of the product by the end user, which im-
plies the end user’s consent to the end user agreement terms.55 Be-
cause end users rarely read the terms, critics argue these agreements 
                                                                                                                  
 50. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1136 
(2003); see also G. Gervaise Davis III, The Affirmative Defense of Copyright Misuse and 
Efforts to Establish Trademark Misuse, and Fraud on the Copyright Office, at 360-61 (Pa-
tents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, PLI Order 
No. 19139, 2009). 
 51. Copyright owners relegislate their rights through “ubiquitous clickwrap and 
browsewrap licensing.” Loren, supra note 4, at 495; see also Elizabeth M.N. Morris, Will
Shrinkwrap Suffocate Fair Use?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 237, 266 
(2007). 
 52. Richard G. Kunkel, Recent Developments in Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap and Browse-
wrap Licenses in the United States, 9 MURDOCH U. ELEC. J. L. 3 (2002),
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n3/kunkel93.html.  
 53. Id. at ¶ 38.  
 54. See generally Loren, supra note 4, at 508-12 (arguing that unconscionability, 
deeming contracts void as against public policy, and preemption of EULAs by copyright law 
generally fail to combat potential misuses of click-wrap and shrink-wrap EULAs). 
 55. Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License: 
Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European 
Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 18 (2002). 
2011] A NEW ROLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 421
lack mutuality.56 These end user agreements place enormous power 
in the hands of companies.57
 With the knowledge that end users rarely read the agreements 
and that courts will enforce the terms, copyright owners draft end 
user agreements to include terms that benefit the copyright owner 
and control the use of their products.58 Companies use EULAs to pre-
vent end users from benchmark testing or reverse engineering their 
products, to regulate the resale of their products, and even to prohibit 
end users from review or criticism of their products or the companies 
themselves.59 As soon as courts began enforcing the terms of shrink-
wrap and click-wrap agreements, companies recognized tortious in-
terference as a second model (beyond traditional breach of contract 
actions) to enforce those agreements. This is illustrated by the MDY 
Industries, LLC and Lexmark, Inc. cases. 
 These cases also reveal the positive and negative implications of 
tortious interference as a model to enforce EULAs. First, even if 
DMCA critics convince Congress to limit the DMCA’s Anticircumven-
tion Rule to prevent use of the DMCA or contract to expand copyright 
terms beyond traditional copyright law through EULAs, copyright 
owners can continue to enforce shrink-wrap and click-wrap EULAs 
through tortious interference to control end users and competition. 
This is great because tortious interference benefits copyright owners 
and other companies where it is close to impossible to attain damages 
from end users through a direct breach of contract action.60 But, it 
also gives rise to potential misuse by companies who draft terms with 
no intent of ever enforcing them against the contracting party—and 
only intend to enforce the terms against competition.  
B.   MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.
 Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. created World of Warcraft (WoW), 
the “largest and most successful multiplayer online game in the 
world,”61 that allows many players to interact with each other 
through “avatars,” live in-game interaction, and voice-chat, as if they 
are all in the same room, though they may be continents apart in re-
ality.62 One of the three main goals in WoW is to enjoy the social, 
                                                                                                                  
 56. Id.
 57. Loren, supra note 4, at 496-98.  
 58. Id.
 59. Id. at 497.  
 60. See id. at 496-97 (discussing the increased use of click-wrap and shrink-wrap agree-
ments because of increased ability for copyright owners to control copyrighted material). 
 61. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
 62. Plaintiff MDY Industries, LLC, and Third Party Defendant Michael Donnelly’s 
Statement of Facts in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, MDY Indus.,
616 F. Supp. 2d 958 (No. CV06-02555-PHX-DGC). 
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role-playing feature of the game.63 In addition to buying the game 
itself, a WoW end user must also subscribe to an online account for a 
monthly fee.64 She must also agree to the terms of Blizzard’s EULA 
and terms of use agreement, which allow her to install the software 
onto her computer(s) and make one “archival”65 compact disc copy of 
the game. When the end user launches WoW to access WoW game 
servers, she makes a copy of WoW on her computer’s Random Access 
Memory (RAM).66
 The terms also prohibit the end user from creating or using “bots . 
. . or any other third-party software designed to modify the World of 
Warcraft experience.”67 A bot (short for “software robot”)68 is a pro-
gram enabling users to play WoW on “auto-pilot,” which allegedly 
results in a direct loss of WoW’s income because it causes user dissat-
isfaction by destroying the live aspect and fair competition in the 
game.69 To enforce the EULAs, Blizzard monitors the end user’s com-
puter RAM with a program called “Warden” to detect the use of a 
third party program enabling the use of bots.70 Upon such detection, 
the license agreement gives Blizzard grounds to cancel the end  
user’s account.71
 Michael Donnelly, doing business as MDY Industries, Inc., created 
and subsequently sold the program “Glider” to WoW users.72 Glider is 
a bot that plays WoW on autopilot while users are away from their 
                                                                                                                  
 63. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. and Vivendi Games, Inc. Statement of Facts in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, MDY Indus., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958 (No. CV06-
02555-PHX-DGC).  
 64. Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62, at 2. 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 10.  
 67. Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62, at 19. 
 68. Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 10. 
 69. Id. at 11-13 (“[B]ots can play much longer than a human without stopping.”). Bots 
harm WoW because they cause a loss of revenue resulting from (1) a loss in monthly fees—
bots can advance faster through the use of automated play, shortening the life of the game, 
and in turn, reducing life of monthly payments to WoW, (2) a loss of WoW users—bots de-
stroy the integrity of the game, in that other users now play against bots (who have a per-
ceived unfair advantage of jumping levels and gain WoW wealth at unequal rates) instead 
of live players, and (3) employee time spent dealing with user complaints about bots and 
detecting the bots. Id. at 11, 15. From December 22, 2004 to March 18, 2008, Blizzard re-
ceived over 465,000 user grievances against bots. Id. at 15. 
 70. Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62, at 7; Bliz-
zard and Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 20-22. 
 71. See Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62 at 7; 
Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 20-22. 
 72. Glider is also known as “WoWGlider” and “MMOGlider.” Blizzard and Vivendi’s 
Statement of Facts, supra note 63 at 3, 22; Benjamin Duranske, MDY Industries v. Bliz-
zard: Preliminary Filings Complete; Protective Order Entered, VIRTUALLY BLIND
(Sept. 6, 2007), http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/09/06/mdy-v-blizzard-summary-and-update-
preliminary-filings-complete-protective-order-entered/. 
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computers and purposefully circumvents Warden’s detection.73 On 
MDY Industries’ Glider website, a message warns WoW customers that 
using Glider constituted a breach of Blizzard’s end user agreement.74
 Instead of suing its end user consumers, Blizzard Entertainment 
sued MDY Industries under the DMCA’s Anticircumvention Rule75
and tortious interference. The United States District Court of Arizo-
na held that when an end user logs on to play WoW and accesses 
WoW game servers, she makes an unauthorized copy of WoW on her 
computer’s RAM because authorized use bans the user from bot soft-
ware. The court found MDY Industries liable on both counts.76 Even 
if Congress altered the DMCA, Blizzard Entertainment would still 
win on the tortious interference claim.77
 The court reasoned that (1) Blizzard Entertainment’s user agree-
ments constitute valid contractual relationships; (2) that Donnelly, 
doing business as MDY Industries, knew of the user agreements be-
cause he agreed to one himself as a WoW user; (3) MDY Industries 
intentionally and improperly interfered with and caused a breach of 
the end user agreement; and (4) Blizzard suffered damages because 
the bots destroyed the live aspect of the game, and customers left or 
would leave as a result.78 To determine the third prong of whether 
Donnelly acted improperly, in an earlier order addressing a motion 
for summary judgment the court used the Restatement’s seven fac-
tors, granting most weight to the following: (1) MDY Industries kno-
wingly assisted the breach of valid contracts between users and Bliz-
zard Entertainment; (2) MDY Industries intentionally avoided detec-
tion of that interference, thereby placing Blizzard at risk; and (3) 
MDY Industries was motivated by financial gain.79 Minimizing MDY 
Industries’ interests, the court explained that the success of its crea-
                                                                                                                  
 73. Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62, at 9-11. 
Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 12. 
 74. Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 33.  
 75. The court reasoned that (1) “WoW has a valid copyright in the dynamic, nonliteral 
components of the game”; (2) access to those elements is controlled by Warden, the techno-
logical measures Blizzard designed to effectively control access to its copyrighted game 
WoW, which Glider circumvents; (3)/(4) Glider gives users unauthorized access to WoW, in 
that the user need not be screened by Warden; (5) once users gain this unauthorized ac-
cess, they can copy the elements as they are displayed (onto the user computer’s RAM); and 
(6) Glider is specifically designed and marketed to circumvent Warden. MDY Indus., LLC 
v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 967-68 (D. Ariz. 2009) (holding that MDY 
Industries violated 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006)). Warden monitors user access only with 
respect to the nonliteral, user-interface component of the game, as opposed to the literal 
code of the game, which Warden is not designed to monitor. Id. at 966-67. Thus, Glider only 
circumvents Warden’s monitoring of nonliteral aspects of the game. Id.
 76. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 971, 973. (D.  
Ariz. 2009).  
 77. See id. at 970-71. 
 78. Id.
 79. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DCG, 2008 WL 
2757357, at *15-16 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008). 
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tive innovation interest literally depended on the success of WoW and 
implied that MDY Industries’ actions were exploitative,80 parasitic, 
and not competitive.81
C.   Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.82
 Lexmark, a manufacturer of printers and printer accessories, in-
cludes a patented chip in every Lexmark ink cartridge that matches 
a mirror chip in every Lexmark printer such that end users of 
Lexmark printers cannot use any other manufacturer’s ink cartridge 
with a Lexmark printer.83 The court refers to this mechanism as 
“handshake” technology because the chip in the Lexmark cartridge 
must “shake hands” with the chip in the Lexmark printer to work.84
Lexmark also placed a DMCA-type preventative mechanism in the 
printer software to prevent others from obtaining access to hand-
shake technology.85 Lexmark sells its customers two types of car-
tridges: discounted cartridges that come with a prebate agreement on 
the shrink-wrap package and full-price cartridges with no such 
agreement.86 The prebate terms restrict the end user from using the 
cartridges more than one time, and after that initial use, the terms 
bind the end user to return the cartridge to Lexmark for “remanufac-
turing and recycling.”87
 A company called Static Control provides printer-related services 
to the end users of many printer brands,88 and sells microchips to 
third-party companies for use in remanufactured toner cartridges.89
This chip enables Lexmark printer users to purchase and use Static 
Control ink cartridges in Lexmark printers.90 Lexmark filed copy-
right infringement and tortious interference claims91 arguing that 
                                                                                                                  
 80. Id. at 16.  
 81. Id.
 82. Discussion of this case is based off of two different orders. In one ruling, the circuit 
court ruled on the DMCA cause of action. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Compo-
nents, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 545-53 (6th Cir. 2004). In a separate ruling, the district court 
ruled that the prebate agreement constituted a contract for the purposes of tortious inter-
ference by denying Static Control’s motion for partial summary judgment that there are no 
prebate or return “[c]ontracts” “[b]ecause Lexmark [c]annot [s]how any [m]eeting of the 
[m]inds.” See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830, 
860 (E.D. Ky. 2007).  
 83. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 387 F.3d at 530.   
 84. Id.  
 85. Lexmark claimed that the code was a “checksum” device that acted as a security 
system and therefore constituted an anticircumvention device. Id. at 531. The court disa-
greed. Id.
 86.  Static Control Components, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
 87. Id.
 88. See Static Control Components, http://www.scc-inc.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
 89.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 387 F.3d at 529.   
 90. Id. at 550. 
 91.   Lexmark filed “claims for intentional interference with contractual relations, in-
tentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and civil conspiracy.” Static 
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Static Control had to tamper with Lexmark’s DMCA anticircumven-
tion handshake code to obtain the handshake software. Lexmark also 
argued that its prebate agreement constituted a contract between 
Lexmark and Lexmark end users, thus Static Control tortiously in-
terfered with Lexmark’s EULA.92
 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky struck down the DMCA claim. The court found that Lexmark’s 
preventative mechanism did not sufficiently control access to the 
printer’s handshake software code because anyone who purchased a 
Lexmark printer could read the copyrighted code from a Lexmark 
printer’s memory. The postsale reuse restriction on the cartridge was 
unenforceable under the first-sale doctrine.93
 Although the tortious interference claim is currently pending ap-
peal, the district court upheld Lexmark’s prebate EULA as a valid 
contract94 despite Static Control’s arguments that the prebate agree-
ment lacked mutuality because it denied customers the opportunity 
to agree to the terms and conditions of the prebate contract.95 The 
district court analogized the preterms to shrink-wrap licenses that 
take effect when the customer unwraps the package (when he can 
read and agree to those terms).96 If the Lexmark court follows the 
MDY court’s reasoning—and the current standard of liability for tor-
tious interference—it will likely hold Static Control liable for tortious 
interference. Lexmark’s EULA constitutes a valid contractual rela-
tionship. Static Control likely knew of the prebate EULAs. Using the 
seven Restatement factors, the court will likely hold Static Control’s 
knowledge of the prebate terms and motive of financial gain suffi-
cient to prove that Static Control intentionally and improperly inter-
fered with Lexmark’s prebate EULA. If Lexmark can prove that it 
suffered damages because it never received the used cartridges, 
Lexmark will likely also win a tortious interference claim against 
Static Control.  
                                                                                                                  
Control Components, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 844. 
 92. “Lexmark’s Return Program provides consumers with discounted prices on car-
tridges if they agree at the time of purchase to return the empty cartridges to Lexmark.” 
Charles Brewer, Lexmark’s Return Program: Prebate for Inkjet Cartridges, RECHARGER
MAGAZINE, (Dec. 1, 2006), http://rechargermag.com/articles/2006/12/01/ lexmarks-return-
program-prebate-for-inkjet-cartridges.aspx.  
 93. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 
588 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
 94. Static Control Components, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 860 (refusing to affirm Static 
Control’s motion for partial summary judgment which argued that Lexmark cannot show 
any meeting of the minds therefore there are no prebate or return contracts). 
 95. See id. at 844-45. 
 96. Id. at 845. 
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IV.   IMPLICATIONS OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AS A MODEL TO 
ENFORCE END USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS AND A PROPOSED 
MISUSE DOCTRINE
A.   Implications of the End User Cases 
 The two cases discussed above illustrate two important develop-
ments in the doctrine of tortious interference. First, even if critics 
convince Congress to limit the DMCA’s Anticircumvention Rule, tor-
tious interference claims remain available for companies to control 
end users and expand copyright terms through EULAs. Second, the 
expansion of tortious interference has both legitimate and problemat-
ic implications. Blizzard’s legitimate use reveals that tortious inter-
ference serves an important role by providing a practical remedy 
when end users breach the terms of EULAs and contract claims 
against the end users themselves would be too costly, both financially 
and politically. However, Lexmark’s use of tortious interference cor-
ners the cartridge market and suggests the need to limit tortious in-
terference as a model to control end users. Therefore, while tortious 
interference serves a new, legitimate role granting companies a rem-
edy at law when third parties wrongly assist end users to violate 
their contractual obligations, the misuse of tortious interference to 
control competition suggests this new model needs limits.  
 The difficulty of enforcing WoW EULAs and the fact that gamers 
could not breach without the help of MDY Industries’ Glider program 
justifies Blizzard’s use of tortious interference. Even without the 
DMCA claim, Blizzard Entertainment’s appropriate use of tortious 
interference allows it to control end user access and use of WoW. In 
MDY Industries, tortious interference serves a valid role by protect-
ing a EULA from interference by a third party. Typical WoW gamers 
could not breach without the help of MDY Industries. Without MDY 
Industries’ bot program, Glider, WoW gamers have no practical or 
immediate way to breach the WoW EULA term banning the use of 
bots. As the court held, the success of MDY Industries’ creative inno-
vation interest literally depended on the success of WoW. The court 
implied that MDY Industries’ actions were exploitative and parasitic, 
instead of innovative and competitive.97
 Blizzard’s EULA establishes grounds on which Blizzard may can-
cel an end user’s account that uses Glider—an unattractive remedy 
because cancelling the end user’s account can lead to that end user 
no longer paying the monthly WoW fee to play the game. With thou-
sands of WoW end users, litigating each breach would result in 
enormous costs and bad public relations. Thus, enforcing the terms of 
                                                                                                                  
 97. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DCG, 2008 WL 
2757357, at *16 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008). 
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their agreement or suing the end users for breach of contract renders 
Blizzard without a practical contract remedy. Tortious interference 
provides an alternate remedy by preventing MDY Industries from 
providing the Glider program that enables end users to use bots and 
breach the terms of the WoW EULA. The impractical remedy of en-
forcing WoW EULAs, paired with gamers’ inability to breach without 
the help of MDY Industries’ Gilder program, justifies Blizzard’s use 
of tortious interference.   
 In contrast, Lexmark’s use of EULAs raises concern that it drafts 
prebate agreements with the intent to enforce the terms against com-
petition not its users, which is an illegitimate use of tortious interfer-
ence. As discussed above, Lexmark will likely prevail on its tortious 
interference claim because the court upheld Lexmark’s prebate agree-
ment as a valid contract. Lexmark has two possible motives to bring 
this claim: one, to get the benefit of the prebate agreement bargains 
since prebate cartridges were sold at a discounted price and two, to 
keep competition like Static Control out of the cartridge industry.  
 While Lexmark has a valid contract claim against the end users, a 
close look reveals that a tortious interference claim is illegitimate. A 
successful tortious interference claim would allow Lexmark to indirectly 
control its end users by preventing Static Control from helping Lexmark 
end users get a better deal on printer cartridges. Here, the users do not 
need Static Control’s help to breach the prebate agreement. Lexmark 
printer owners do not need help to fail in returning the cartridge. 
Lexmark end users can breach without Static Control’s interference. 
Instead of providing an alternate remedy where a third party enables 
the end users to breach where it is otherwise impractical, tortious inter-
ference would allow Lexmark to control its cartridge market.  
 While it may not be the case here, Lexmark’s use of tortious inter-
ference illustrates the potential for companies to draft contracts with 
no intent of ever enforcing the terms against end users, but with the 
sole intent of enforcing the terms against the competition. As with all 
third parties to a contract, competitors like Static Control have no 
bargaining power under the EULA terms and no way to escape a tor-
tious interference claim under the current system.   
 These claims suggest a new use for tortious interference—a means 
to control end users. In both cases, the courts upheld the existence of 
a contract when Lexmark and MDY Industries used shrink-wrap 
(prebate) and click-wrap EULAs.98 Instead of enforcing terms against 
breaching end users who use bots or fail to return a cartridge to 
                                                                                                                  
 98. Enormous power is placed in the hands of companies, causing the massive, though 
so far unsuccessful movement to limit the enforceability of shrink-wrap and click-wrap 
agreements. See generally Loren, supra note 4, at 495 n.2 (providing a representative sam-
ple of scholarly articles). 
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Lexmark for “remanufacturing and recycling,”99 the companies used 
tortious interference as a model to enforce the terms against competi-
tion. Even if courts strike down DMCA claims, tortious interference 
grants copyright owners another method to control end users’ access 
to their copyrighted material. This is problematic in Lexmark be-
cause Lexmark is trying to monopolize the cartridge market. But, 
tortious interference is appropriate in MDY Industries because it 
overcomes the difficulty of enforcing WoW EULAs against end users 
in a context where end users cannot breach without the help of third 
party MDY Industries. 
B.   Implications of Tortious Interference as a Model to Enforce End 
User License Agreements 
 As discussed in Section III.A., because end users rarely read or 
understand the terms of click-wrap and shrink-wrap agreements,100
EULAs place enormous power in the hands of copyright owners to 
draft terms that regulate the use of their copyrighted works.101 With 
knowledge that end users rarely read the agreements and that courts 
will enforce the terms, copyright owners draft EULAs to include a 
massive amount of terms that benefit the copyright owner and con-
trol the use of their products.102 These cases illustrate that as soon as 
courts began enforcing the terms of shrink-wrap and click-wrap 
agreements, companies recognized tortious interference as a second 
model (beyond traditional breach of contract actions) to enforce 
agreements. This is both beneficial and problematic.  
 As seen with Blizzard, sometimes the use of a tortious interfer-
ence claim is the only practical remedy available to contracting par-
ties—especially when used to enforce EULAs—because cost and pub-
lic relations concerns render impractical the attainment of damages 
from end users through a direct breach of contract action.103 There-
fore, courts should not completely eliminate tortious interference as a 
model to enforce EULAs. It provides a cause of action to companies 
like Blizzard Entertainment, where there is no practical claim at law 
in the absence of tortious interference because EULA breach claims 
are too financially and politically costly.  
 This use of tortious interference also allows the cause of action to 
serve its traditionally valid role of providing a stable marketplace by 
encouraging parties to make contracts, supplementing contract law 
                                                                                                                  
 99. Static Control Components, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
 100. See Loren, supra note 4, at 497; cf. Determann & Fellmeth, supra note 55, at 18 
(noting that software publishers generally do not require users to expressly confirm ac-
ceptance of the terms of the EULA). 
 101. See Loren, supra note 4, at 497.  
 102. Id.
 103. See sources cited supra note 50. 
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by availing punitive damages when the breaching party is insolvent, 
enforcing the morality of promise, and allocating liability to the least-
cost avoider of the harm. 
 However, as seen in Lexmark’s use of tortious interference, tor-
tious interference as a model to enforce EULAs gives rise to potential 
misuse by companies who draft terms of EULAs with no intent of ev-
er enforcing them against the end users, but rather competition, with 
the goal of suppression. This highlights one of the major problems 
inherent to imputing liability to a party with no privity to the con-
tract, as discussed in Section II. 
C.   A Proposed Misuse Doctrine 
 In response to the potential misuse and benefits of tortious inter-
ference as a model to enforce EULAs, this Note suggests a misuse 
doctrine to prevent companies from enforcing a EULA with tortious 
interference by drafting their EULA without intent to enforce the 
agreement against the end user. 
1.   Defendant’s Proof of Lack of “But For” Causation Triggers  
Presumption of Misuse
 Under this misuse doctrine, the burden initially rests on the 
plaintiff to prove tortious interference under the seven Restatement
factors. If the plaintiff proves tortious interference and the contract 
at issue is a EULA, then the defendant can bring a misuse defense: if 
the defendant proves that the end user could have breached the EU-
LA independent of the defendant’s actions, the court will find a pre-
sumption of misuse on the part of the plaintiff and bar the tortious 
interference claim. The court will presume, as a matter of law, that 
the plaintiff drafted the terms of the EULA to enforce against third 
parties, rather than end users.  
 If the defendant fails to prove the end user could have breached 
the EULA independent of the defendant’s actions, the defendant may 
be liable for tortious interference. Liability still exists in all tortious 
interference cases with EULA claims against defendants where the 
end user could practically not have breached “but for” the defendant’s 
conduct. This provides a safety valve for plaintiffs to use tortious in-
terference as a model to enforce EULAs when she has no viable al-
ternative cause of action or remedy at law.  
2. Rebutting the Presumption: “Specific Targeting and Soliciting” 
and “No Other Use”
 If the defendant successfully proves that the end user could have 
breached independent of the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff can re-
but the presumption of misuse (that it drafted the EULA terms with-
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out intent to enforce them against the end users). To rebut the pre-
sumption, the plaintiff must provide evidence that the defendant tar-
geted and solicited its end users to breach their EULAs and that 
there is no other use for the defendant’s conduct, product, or service 
other than to help the end user breach. In other words, the defendant 
specifically targeted and solicited the parties to the plaintiff’s con-
tract. Once this proof is established, the plaintiff can successfully re-
but the misuse presumption and assert tortious interference with a 
EULA. This provides a second safety valve for the use of tortious in-
terference to enforce EULAs when the plaintiff has no other cause of 
action available because of the massive amount of end users it would 
need to sue to find a true remedy (and the defendant is actually at 
fault for the breach). 
D.   Application of the Proposed Misuse Doctrine 
 1.   As Applied to MDY Industries, Inc.
 The misuse doctrine allows the proper use of tortious interference 
with EULAs in the digital age. When WoW end users operate MDY 
Industries’ Glider software to use bots in WoW, they breach their 
EULA with Blizzard Entertainment. As seen in the MDY Industries 
opinion, applying the seven Restatement factors finds MDY Indus-
tries liable for tortious interference. 
 MDY Industries might try to invoke the misuse doctrine by argu-
ing that Blizzard Entertainment’s end users could circumvent WoW 
security without the help of MDY Industries’ Glider bot, and just 
happened to use Glider to do it. A successful circumvention might 
look like evidence provided by MDY Industries showing that the 
WoW end user who breached the particular EULA before the court 
happens to be a computer programmer capable of writing her own bot 
software. While possible, this scenario is unlikely to apply to all WoW 
users that breached the EULA and used bots. 
 Even if MDY Industries successfully invokes the misuse doctrine, 
Blizzard Entertainment can rebut the presumption of misuse by as-
serting that MDY Industries specifically solicits and targets WoW 
customers. MDY Industries’ Glider website warning to WoW custom-
ers that using Glider breaches their contract with Blizzard Enter-
tainment evidences such specific solicitation and targeting. MDY 
specifically made Glider to circumvent Warden and allow the use of 
bots in WoW software. The misuse doctrine does not prevent Blizzard 
Entertainment from bringing a tortious interference claim if there is 
no other use for Glider beyond providing bots for WoW users.  
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2.   As Applied to Lexmark 
 Applying this to Lexmark, the burden of proof would rest on plain-
tiff Lexmark to prove tortious interference with their EULA. If 
Lexmark successfully proves that Static Control tortiously interfered 
with its EULA, then Static Control can invoke the misuse doctrine as 
a defense. To invoke the misuse doctrine, Static Control must show 
that its end users had the ability to breach without any help from 
Static Control. Here, Static Control successfully meets that burden 
because Lexmark’s end users can use cartridges more than once or 
fail to return cartridges to Lexmark without the help of Static Con-
trol. For instance, the prebate terms do not prohibit Lexmark users 
from independently selling their used cartridge to another Lexmark 
customer. The end users can breach independently of Static Control’s 
refill program. Therefore, the court would find misuse and presume 
as a matter of law that Lexmark drafted its prebate terms with no 
intent of ever enforcing them against its consumers.  
 Unless Lexmark can rebut the presumption of misuse by proving 
that Static Control specifically targeted and solicited Lexmark end 
users to breach the prebate agreement, the misuse doctrine would 
bar Lexmark’s tortious interference claim. Lexmark will likely fail to 
rebut the presumption because Static Control provides other services 
to end users of other printer brands.104 Static Control’s refill program 
and microchips have uses beyond filling solely Lexmark cartridges, 
and unlike MDY Industries, Static Control has no website or other 
marketing material that specifically targets and solicits Lexmark 
customers. Therefore, the misuse doctrine would bar Lexmark from 
bringing a tortious interference claim.  
3.   Potentially Problematic End User License Agreements
 As discussed in Section III.A., companies use EULAs to prevent 
end users from benchmark testing or reverse engineering their prod-
ucts, to regulate the resale of their products, and even to prohibit end 
users from review or criticism of their products or the companies 
themselves. The misuse doctrine addresses other possible misuses of 
EULAs that are struck down under the DMCA misuse model.105 For 
instance, when an end user downloads NetBeans software created by 
Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Microsystems) and Oracle Corporation, she 
agrees to Microsystems’ EULA that prohibits the publication or pro-
vision to any third party of any tests on or comparisons of the prod-
                                                                                                                  
 104. See Static Control Components, http://www.scc-inc.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
 105. See Loren, supra note 4, at 518 (discussing Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
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uct.106 If the end user were to breach the agreement and post a review 
of NetBeans on Amazon.com, for example, tortious interference theo-
retically allows Microsystems to sue Amazon.com if Microsystems 
meets the Restatement test, which, as illustrated in this Note, is not 
difficult to do. Therefore, tortious interference currently allows Mi-
crosystems to control the content of Amazon.com without ever draft-
ing a contract with Amazon.com.107
 If Microsystems proves that Amazon.com tortiously interfered 
with Microsystems’ contract with Microsystems’ end users, Ama-
zon.com may invoke the misuse doctrine by asserting that Microsys-
tems’ end users can critique NetBeans anywhere they wish and just 
happened to post critiques on Amazon.com’s website. The misuse doc-
trine prevents Microsystems from suing any party that runs a forum 
encouraging discussion about products because the end users’ breach 
does not depend on any of the forums specifically. Under the pro-
posed misuse doctrine, the court would presume, as a matter of law, 
that Microsystems drafted the terms of the EULA to enforce against 
third parties, never intending to enforce the terms against its  
end users.  
 Microsystems could then only win on tortious interference if it 
proves that Amazon.com specifically targeted and solicited the con-
sumers to review NetBeans. Because Amazon.com sells many prod-
ucts and offers a forum for reviews of those products from many dif-
ferent manufacturers, it did not. There are many uses for Ama-
zon.com beyond critiquing NetBeans. Therefore, Microsystems would 
fail to rebut a finding of misuse and the doctrine would bar Microsys-
tems from a tortious interference claim to control the content  
of Amazon.com.  
                                                                                                                  
    106. License Agreement for NetBeans with JavaFX (NB 6.9.1 / FX 1.3.1), Sun Mi-
crosystems, Inc. (“Sun”) Software License Agreement § 5(f), https://cds.sun.com/is-
bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/CDS-CDS_Developer-Site/en_US/-/USD/ViewLicense-
Start?LicenseUUID=PHGJ_hCwLwQAAAEqBzUMmzR.&ProductUUID=TK2J_hCwOHQ
AAAEq154MmzR_&cnum=&evsref=&sln= (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (“You may not pub-
lish or provide the results of any benchmark or comparison tests run on Software to any 
third party without the prior written consent of Sun.”). Professor Lydia Pallas Loren’s re-
search on end user agreements that expand copyright terms via contract law provides a 
similar example: the exclusive licensee of Disney’s online movie trailers must agree to an 
EULA term prohibiting commentary that is “ ‘derogatory to or critical of the entertainment 
industry or of [Disney] . . . or of any motion picture produced or distributed by [Disney].’ ” 
Loren, supra note 4, at 518 (quoting Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 
342 F.3d 191, 203 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
 107. This may not succeed on tortious interference because the defendant, here Ama-
zon.com, must know that there is a contract to be liable for tortious interference. This as-
sumes that Amazon.com knows about the contract between Oracle and Oracle’s end users. 
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E.   Implications of the Proposed Misuse Doctrine 
 The misuse doctrine prevents companies from drafting EULAs to 
corner the market, as Lexmark did with its EULAs. It also prevents 
misuse by companies who draft contracts specifically to enforce 
against third party competitors and not actual contracting parties—
because if the end user could independently breach the EULA, the 
doctrine bars a tortious interference claim. However, the misuse doc-
trine allows room for tortious interference when justified and neces-
sary to protect contracts from meddling third parties, as in Blizzard 
Entertainment’s use of tortious interference against MDY Industries. 
Finally, the misuse doctrine prevents companies like Sun Microsys-
tems, Inc. from enforcing EULAs restricting review or criticism of 
their products. 
 Admittedly, this misuse theory is underinclusive because it leaves 
many cases where the end user can breach independently, 
but there is no practical remedy for the plaintiff other than tortious 
interference. While Lexmark still has a breach of contract claim at 
law against its many breaching end users, such claims do not provide 
a practical remedy at law because the expensive cost of litigation far 
outweighs recovering a few dollars worth of lost profit due to their 
unrealized prebate discount scheme; it also does not address the al-
ienation of Lexmark customers should it bring a breach of EULA ac-
tion against its end users directly.  
 However, the misuse doctrine prevents the potential misuse of tor-
tious interference: the practice of drafting terms with no intent of ev-
er enforcing them against the contracting party. It allows a tortious 
interference cause of action, a safety valve, where a contracting party 
has breached as a direct cause of the defendant's action (in many 
cases, where no practical remedy for the plaintiff exists beyond tor-
tious interference).  
VI.   CONCLUSION
 This Note examined tortious interference, its controversial histo-
ry, and the new uses for tortious interference in the digital age. 
Through an overview of recent cases from the unlikely field of copy-
right law, we find that parties to copyright litigation are using tor-
tious interference as a model to enforce end user license agreements. 
This is both genius and problematic. It is genius on the part of those 
bringing breach of end user license agreement claims because tor-
tious interference grants companies a remedy at law when third par-
ties induce end users to breach their end user agreement. It solves 
the problem posed by enormous litigation costs—not to mention pub-
lic relations expenses—required to sue potentially thousands of end 
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users in the digital age.108 However, tortious interference can also be 
misused in the digital age: it creates an incentive on the part of com-
panies to write end user agreements without ever intending to en-
force the terms against the end users themselves. Instead, these 
companies intend to enforce the terms against their competition. This 
is extremely questionable because it usurps the underlying philoso-
phy of tortious interference and contract law; it also expands copy-
right terms beyond that intended by the DMCA. Ultimately, this 
Note suggests that tortious interference should be utilized as a new 
model to enforce end user license agreements. However, this Note 
also suggests limiting this new model’s negative implications with a 
burden-shifting misuse doctrine, thus preserving tortious interfer-
ence only where necessary to fill in the gaps of contract law.  
 While this Note limits its discussion of tortious interference mis-
use to EULAs in the digital age specifically, the theory could be ap-
plied on a broader scale to tortious interference generally. While the 
misuse doctrine does not address some of the perceived inconsisten-
cies between tortious interference and traditional contract law, like 
efficient breach, it redefines and narrows the vague standard of lia-
bility that haunts tortious interference. It could prevent the enforce-
ment of contractual terms against third parties who never bargained 
for them and could narrow the forever poorly defined scope of tortious 
interference liability to one requiring targeting and soliciting of the 
breaching party. The misuse doctrine could preserve and promote the 
truly heroic safety valve function of tortious interference beyond the 
EULA context while simultaneously limiting its less admirable at-
tributes to preserve the integrity of contract law.  
                                                                                                                  
 108. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 8. 
